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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamics of the Portuguese labor market using micro data:
implications of adjustment costs to input factor adjustment throughout the business
cycle are discussed; the current situation of the Portuguese labor market is reviewed;
and measures of speed of adjustment for dierent types of labor (namely, the number
of workers and the number of hours employed by rms) are obtained using a System
GMM estimator and compared to those obtained for other countries. Additionally, we
provide the median adjustment lag and short- and long-run labor demand elasticities
with respect to rms' wages and sales. We conclude that the Portuguese labor market
is slow in adjustment relative to other countries, while there is no evidence to support
the claim that adjustment through the number of hours employed is faster than the
adjustment through the number of workers employed.
JEL Classi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Keywords: Labor demand, Adjustment dynamics, Adjustment costs, System GMM,
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This paper provides an empirical investigation of the labor adjustment dynamics in the
Portuguese labor market. We propose to evaluate the level of rigidity present in workforce
adjustments through a System GMM estimation procedure using micro data. Additionally,
we provide the median adjustment lag (a related measure of adjustment speed) and short-
and long-run labor demand elasticities with respect to rms' wages and sales.
Even though economists have tried to understand the determinants of business cycles
in an attempt to attenuate 
uctuations, they are still around. Firms will inevitably need to
adjust their input factors in response to changes in the demand throughout the business
cycle; therefore, rigidities in factor input adjustment are of the greatest importance at
both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). At the
microeconomic level, the dynamics of labor adjustment allow for optimal labor market
policy design. Only if elasticities of factor demand relatively to shocks are known can
the government predict the market response and thus decide on the optimal policy to
implement. At the macroeconomic level, rigidities in factor markets partly determine the
speed and depth of factor adjustment throughout the business cycle and, consequently,
the dynamics of investment, employment and output.
Although a rigid labor legislation contributes actively to decrease cyclical 
uctuations
in product supply, it also prevents a rapid adjustment when necessary; and since the
demand side of the economy is generally less rigid, short run discrepancies between supply
and demand for goods will be harder to accommodate the more stringent labor legislation
is. The eects of the often-called eurosclerosis1 have been well documented. Countries
with overprotectionist labor legislation, which imposes costs to the operating rms and
causes sluggishness in the labor adjustment process, evolve to have inecient outcomes
on several economic dimensions. For instance, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) nd that
high ring costs imply slower and more uncertain growth and Heckman (2002) nds that
incentives to innovate, to acquire skills, and to take risks have been thwarted by the welfare
state.
Section 2 provides an overview and the theoretical framework of the consequences of
adjustment costs. Section 3 contains a brief summary of the Portuguese labor market
statistics and legislation important for the determination of rigidities. Section 4 sets out
the estimation procedure to assess the level of sluggishness in the Portuguese labor market.
Section 5 describes the dataset used and Section 6 the results obtained. Lastly, Section 7
provides some concluding remarks.
1The European economic-disease where poor job creation dynamics appear as symptoms of employment-
protectionist policies.
12 Factor Demand and Adjustment Costs
Firms' demand for inputs depends primarily on the level of economic activity, i.e., on
the business cycle. During an expansion rms would like to hire inputs so as to face the
increased demand by consumers for their products or services, whereas during a downturn
rms would like to cut back on input usage to avoid wasting resources, which ultimately
lead to inecient outcomes.
Consider the two main inputs in the production function: capital and labor; capital
is usually assumed to be xed in the short-run, this meaning that rms do not adjust
their capital input instantaneously (following a shock to aggregate demand, for instance).
One of the reasons is that it may be physically impossible, as is in the case of industrial
rms, where capital is usually in the form of heavy machinery and buildings which take
time to build and to set up. This can be viewed as a friction in capital adjustment that
prevents an immediate response following a shock. To face this short-run rigidity rms
can, alternatively, adjust less rigid inputs provided there is a degree of substitutability
between them, and labor is a candidate for just that (see for instance Arrow et al., 1961).
So, in general, we assume capital to be a xed factor and labor to be a variable factor, in
the short-run.
Following Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), we will concentrate not on the physical im-
possibility explanation for sluggishness in input adjustment, but on adjustment costs.
First, because for labor we can not usually rely on the rst explanation to justify rigidi-
ties; and second, because it can be viewed as a generalization, since physical restrictions
also imply a cost: the opportunity cost of time. The existence of adjustment costs implies
that rms may not adjust factor inputs immediately after a shock (or may not adjust
at all). Although this can be due to shortsightedness or myopia by the rms, we can
not in general discard the possibility that it may be a rational decision. Suppose rms
expect (correctly) that a current positive aggregate demand shock will last for only two
periods. If the adjustment process takes one period and is costly, then it may be optimal
to not adjust at all, if adjustment costs overweight the expected net benets of making
the adjustment and reverting it.
2.1 Typology of Adjustment Costs
For the factor input labor the essential distinction for our discussion of the topic of ad-
justment costs is among xed costs, those unaected by the quantity of adjustment in the
labor input (provided that is an adjustment); and variable costs, those directly dependent
on the size of the adjustment. If we now think that labor can actually take the form of
either workers hired or hours hired by the rms, there is the possibility of substituting
one for the other if they do not entail the same adjustment cost structure.
In practice, we can think of a variety of labor adjustment costs for both worker- and
hour-adjustments. In any hiring process there is always the screening cost of selecting
2a new worker which involve advertisement of job vacancies, tests and interview sessions,
administrative costs and on-job training of newly hired workers. Additionally, new hirees
will possibly hinder, only if temporarily, the eciency level of the rm during the adjust-
ment phase; possibly, some costs related to the readjustment of the production process
will also arise. Contrarily to other input factors, however, there are additional costs if the
company decides to part with an employee. Often legislation obliges rms to severance
pay in case of separation. Besides, the sole act to ring a worker implies a great deal
of administrative costs and eciency losses. This suggests that costs are inherent to the
process of hiring and ring a worker, not just to changes in the size of the workforce, and
also hints at a possible asymmetry in the labor adjustment process. Hiring an extra hour
of work from an existing worker entails a considerable lower diversity of costs. Although
rms are obliged to pay overtime wages (equal to the base wage rate plus a premium)
and all the costs that are dependent on the number hours of work, they may be able
to avoid a signicant amount of costs, especially future separation costs. This suggests
that there may be dierences on the balance between the employment of workers and the
dependence on extra-time hours of work. The balance would naturally be a function of
the cost structure of each type of labor.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Let us now examine how the presence of adjustment costs might in
uence rms' deci-
sions. Hamermesh (1993) provides a thorough survey on dynamics of labor demand and
adjustment cost. To understand the impact of adjustment costs on adjustment dynamics,
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For simplicity, we assume that rms have a production function F which depends only
on labor, Lt; they face a cost function C which depends on the size of the adjustment,
_ Lt; and they face exogenous wage rate w and discount rate r. Firms will then maximize,
at each period in time, the discounted future net value of their production. Since we are
interested in studying the eects of labor adjustment costs, which will enter the rms'
maximization problem through the cost function, we will bypass the problems related
to the determination of wages and the interest rate here. What can we expect from
this rm's behavior in the presence of adjustment costs? As for most typical economic
problems, and this one is no exception, it depends; considering the forward-looking nature
of this optimization problem, the labor adjustment pattern following a shock should be
fundamentally determined by the functional form of C and by other factors such as the
rm's expectations about the size and duration of the shock. Let us consider the two
3main categories of adjustment costs: variable costs and xed/lumpy costs under static
expectations.2
If we consider symmetric quadratic variable costs,
C( _ Lt) = aj _ Ltj + b _ L2
t (2)
with a;b > 0 what we would expect is a slow, lagged adjustment towards the equilib-
rium level of employment following an unexpected shock. To see this, observe the general
functional form of the cost function, which tells us that the cost of making an adjust-
ment _ Lt rises quadratically with the level of the adjustment. For the rm, this means
that large adjustments are disproportionately expensive and so, when facing the trade-o
slow adjustment (maintaining a gap relatively to the optimum level of employment for
many periods, which is inecient, but a low cost of adjustment per period) versus fast
adjustment (few gap-periods but a high cost of adjustment per period) the rm will spread
out the adjustment across several periods. How spread out the adjustment is will depend
ultimately on the size of the parameters a and b. Also, following an unexpected shock,
rms will only start the adjustment a period after it occurs (remember rms' expectations
are static). Hence we have a slow and lagged adjustment. A special case can be obtained
if b = 0. In that case, the rm faces a linear adjustment cost function and the optimal
behavior is to adjust immediately and fully, so as to minimize the losses generated by an
o-equilibrium situation.
If we consider xed costs,
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(3)
with k > 0 what we would expect is a step-like, lagged adjustment towards the equilibrium.
Again, a rm has to weight the net benets of a fast adjustment against the net benets
of a slow adjustment. In this case, the rm faces a cost k if it decides to adjust, regardless
of the size of the adjustment, and no cost otherwise. Given this cost function, the rm will
choose either to adjust fully or not adjust at all. Since the cost incurred is independent
of the level of adjustment, if the rm is going to adjust it might as well adjust completely
to equilibrium so as to minimize ineciencies. From this it follows that, for a given level
of k, there is a threshold level, _ L
t, that leads the rm to make the adjustment whenever
_ Lt > _ L
t. This is of course a function of the severity of adjustment costs, and the expected
long-term net benets of an immediate adjustment. In the end, this means that rms
will be willing to accommodate with an 'inecient' outcome if the costs of adjustment are
suciently high and/or the necessary adjustment to equilibrium is small (i.e., ineciency
losses are small).
2Firms' expectation for all future equilibrium levels of employment, L

t+1, is simply its last observed








t for all t and all j > 0.
4Notice that we can compare both these cases with the trivial case of no adjustment
costs, eciency-wise. In the later, where C( _ Lt) = 0 for all levels of _ Lt. Adjustment is not
costly, which means that the optimal response is always to adjust fully and immediately
to equilibrium after a shock. In the former cases, where some form of adjustment cost
is present, the optimal decision will possibly imply a partial adjustment through time,
imposing a loss of eciency at the level of the rm.
Of course, in reality the structure of adjustment costs that rms face should be a
combination of these two extreme cases, that is, most adjustment processes will entail a
component of variable costs and a component of xed costs. As such, we should expect a
rm's adjustment process to lie somewhere in between the two cases described above, i.e.,
we should observe no adjustment for small changes in the equilibrium level of employment
(due to lumpy costs) and smooth adjustment for changes in equilibrium that are higher
than the threshold level (due to quadratic costs). With signicant labor adjustment costs,
labor will be sticky and it can be said that labor is a quasi-xed input.
Evidence shows that labor adjustments costs are indeed quite signicant. Hamermesh
(1993) reviews the signicance of these costs. A survey in 1980 for Los Angeles documents
average hiring and training costs of $5110 for production workers and $13790 for salaried
workers, while ring separation costs are around $370 and $1780, respectively. More
recently, Abowd and Kramarz (2003) estimated the annual adjustment costs of replacing
a worker, by age group and job type, with results ranging from 2:8% to 9:7% of total
annual compensation.
2.3 Consequences
The fact that hiring and separation costs exist will impact negatively on adjustment dy-
namics not only during a downturn (when a rm would like to lay o workers), but also
during an expansionary phase (when a rm would like to hire more workers). On the
one hand, rms will not adjust fast during a recession. They will employ a higher labor
force than the necessary and bear some ineciency costs. On the other hand, if rms are
forward-looking, they will anticipate the costs faced with future eventual separations, and
will refrain from increasing employment during expansions as well. Therefore, adjustment
costs and a strict labor law impose costs at all states of the business cycle. Because rms
can not resize downwards they will be contained in their expansions as well. This (rational)
rm behavior will imply a gap between the optimal workforce and the one observed at each
moment in time, a gap which increases with the level of adjustment costs. The intuition is
that a higher level of adjustment costs will shift rms' incentives either towards a choice of
a smaller workforce relatively to the optimal level thus implying a higher ineciency level.
This happens because the net benets of hiring an additional worker shrink in the pres-
ence of adjustment costs; the reverse behavior might also be observed, i.e., rms having a
larger labor force than 'optimal'|see, for instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994); Dixit
(1997); Pfann and Palm (1993); Nickell (1978); Fay and Medo (1985); Fair (1985). The
5nal outcome is not only bad news for employment, but bad news for economic growth as
well.
Another perverse eect of sizable adjustments costs comes through the weakened
matching opportunities. In a rigid labor market where direct and indirect hiring and
ring costs are high, worker 
ows are small. This pleases the employed, but should also
worry them, as were they to become unemployed new job prospects would be scarce|see,
for instance, Lazear (1990). Worse than this is the fact that the whole economy could
benet, maintaining the same people employed and unemployed, by simply reallocating
them to more appropriate jobs|creating better matches. Rigidities actually work to make
rms not willing to re misplaced workers (bad matches) and workers not willing to quit
rms where they are not happy and most productive (bad matches as well). Eciency is
evidently impaired.
3 The Portuguese Labor Market
3.1 Indicators and Statistics
A number of studies have ranked Portugal among the countries with highest level of
employment protection. For instance, the OECD reports some employment protection
indicators for OECD countries. The analysis of Table A.1 (Appendix) shows that Portugal
has consistently ranked among the most protectionist OECD countries. The situation is
specially serious in the regular employment category where Portugal has ranked rst in
both 1998 and 2008, this meaning that, besides the very rigid labor market we inherited
from previous generations, no eective changes were made|or they did not work out
as expected|during this 10-year period for this particular branch of the labor market.
Regarding temporary employment and collective dismissals, rigidity levels are less serious
and improvements are visible. Overall, there has been an improvement in 
exibility since
1998, showed by the overall strictness index. Still, as of 2008, Portugal remains well above
the OECD average.
Worker 
ows provide another sign of rigidities in the Portuguese labor market. Blan-
chard and Portugal (2001) document the worker 
ows and job creation and destruction
for Portugal and the United States. Table A.2 is a partial reproduction of the authors
Tables 6 and 7. We can clearly observe, analyzing the rst four columns, a higher 
exi-
bility of the American market, with larger 
ows and higher job creation and destruction
dynamics. The remaining three columns show the worker 
ows from employment to (i)
unemployment (ii) non-activity (iii) employment. Again, 
ows in the Portuguese labor
market are smaller (on average 1/3) than those of the United States.
More recent indicators are also available. Figure 1 presents the quarterly labor market

ows between employment, unemployment and inactivity for Portugal in 2010. In a given
quarter, on average, none of the 
ows exceeded 1:5% of active population, which again
6illustrates the slow dynamics of the Portuguese labor market. Table A.3 presents some
statistics on duration of employment and unemployment and incidence of long-term em-
ployment and unemployment for the period 2001-2010. The duration of both employment
and unemployment has been increasing for this period, from 118 to 130 and 18 to 25 weeks,
respectively. This, once more, argues in favor of a sclerotic labor market: employed people
tend to keep their jobs for a longer time and unemployed have a harder time nding a job,
since few vacancies are made available. Although more volatile, the long-term unemploy-
ment has also been on the rise, from 42% to 56% over this period.
Figure 1: Average quarterly 
ows in the Portuguese labor market










Behind the statistics just described there is certainly the impact of adjustment costs, which
are partly imposed by the labor law. In sum, legislation "imposes a long, complex and
costly process on employers", implying "a sequence of time-consuming and potentially
production-disruptive administrative procedures" as Blanchard and Portugal (2001) put
it. OECD (2009) overviews the Portuguese situation on matters of employment legislation.
Firms must notify employees 15 to 75 days (depending to tenure) prior to the proposed
separation date, and also the workers organization or union in the case of a collective
dismissal. After this, employees have 60 days to claim an unfair dismissal, and then a 90
to 240 days trial period follows (according to the nature of the position held), in which the
issue must be settled. In the case of a sporadic dismissal, rms are obliged to severance
pay amounting to one monthly salary for year of tenure, with a minimum of three salaries.
In the case of collective dismissals, compensation is not dened by the law, and should be
negotiated between employers and employees/unions. Even thought seemingly less strict,
collective dismissals are rarely approved.
74 Econometric Model
The empirical analysis conducted here aims at shedding some light on the dynamics of
labor adjustment. This adjustment can vary in speed and length depending on demand-
sided (demand for the rms' products) and supply-sided (structure of adjustment costs and
legislation) economic conditions. What we seek is a measure of how sluggish employment
adjustment is.
4.1 Model Specication
Consider the extension of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model to panel data
yit = yi;t 1 + x0
it + "it (4)
"it = ui + vit (5)
where the subscript i = 1;2;:::;N designates rms and the subscript t = 1;2;:::;T des-
ignates time. For each rm i, yit[T1] is a column vector containing the realizations of
the dependent variable; x0
it[Tk] is matrix containing the information of the k explanatory
variables;  and [k1] are parameters to be estimated; and "it[T1] is a column vector of
error terms, containing a rm-specic and time-independent eect (xed eect) ui and an
idiosyncratic shock (random eect) vit. Also, we assume E[ui] = E[vit] = E[uivit] = 0
(the rm-specic and idiosyncratic error terms have mean zero and are orthogonal) and
E[vitvjt] = 0 for i 6= j (the idiosyncratic error terms are orthogonal across rms).
An application to the "employment equation" is directly obtained by allowing the
dependent variable to be a measure of employment, such as the number of workers or
hours worked, and including other explanatory variables such as the demand for the rms'
products and wages. This gives us a family of parsimonious representations of the dynamics
of the labor demand, for instance
eit = ei;t 1 + s0si;t + s1si;t 1 + w0wi;t + w1wi;t 1 + "it (6)
where eit is the level of employment of rm i at time t which will be measure by the number
of workers (nit) or the number of hours worked (hit). A measure of the adjustment speed
can be obtained through the coecient . The model can of course be augmented with
lags of the explanatory variables and further lags of the dependent variable. It should
be clear that the structure of adjustment costs is not considered here in determining the
speed of adjustment in the labor market.
As already mentioned, our main parameter of interest is the autoregressive parameter
, a proxy for the sluggishness of the labor market. We can think of the adjustment







8where L is the equilibrium employment level. Changes that aect L will trigger an
adjustment process of L towards the new equilibrium level. The process will be slower the
more severe the adjustment costs, as explained earlier. The parameter  moderates the
adjustment in each period, which is given by a fraction of the distance to the equilibrium
level. A lower  implies a lower adjustment speed, hence a higher rigidity level. The
interpretations via  or  are qualitatively symmetrical since  is a rigidity parameter
(high for slow adjustment) whereas  is a 
exibility parameter (high for fast adjustment).
4.2 Estimation
Estimation of the model proposed above requires the use of nonstandard procedures. Sev-
eral remarks can be made from the outset, regarding the nature of the model: (i) in
the presence of xed eects (unobservable rm-specic characteristics that imply dierent
responses for each rm) we can no longer make use of the standard OLS estimation proce-
dures, since the unobserved eects may be correlated with one or more of the explanatory
variables in xit, thus leading to endogeneity. Additionally, OLS delivers downward-biased
coecient estimates for the lagged dependent variable, an eect known as dynamic panel
bias or Nickell bias|see Nickell (1981). In such situations, OLS produces biased and in-
consistent estimates; (ii) another type of endogeneity|simultaneity|may also be present;
if explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous but predetermined by their past values,
they will be correlated with past error terms. This renders the same estimation problems
as the rst point; (iii) the random component of the error term may be heteroskedastic,
showing dierent patterns for dierent rms. This is a less serious problem, aecting only
eciency and not consistency, but still corrections may be necessary for valid inference
purposes.
Even though the problems of this type of model seem overwhelming, solutions have
been designed to overcome them. As typical for models plagued with endogenous vari-
ables, instrumentation oers a promising way out. Building on the work of Holtz-Eakin,
Newey and Rosen (1988) and predecessors, Arellano, Bond, Bover and Blundell's joint
contribution provides the econometric framework necessary to address these same con-
cerns in the contexts of dynamic panel data models. They have proposed two Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The rst one by Arellano and Bond (1991),
called Dierence GMM; and the second one by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998), called System GMM. The Dierence GMM estimator transforms equa-
tions (6) and (5) by using rst dierences of variables to eradicate xed eects from the
model (remember that xed eects are time-independent|they vary only across rms|
thus disappear in rst dierences) under the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors.
System GMM uses instrumental variables to overcome the same problem and relies on a
two-equation model (the original level equation and a dierenced equation). In both cases,
we will eventually have to deal with endogenous variables (whether or not correlated with
xed eects), hence instrumental variables are bound to enter the picture. However, given
9the statistical importance of good instruments and the typical data availability problems
of empirical studies, the immediate solution itself raises another concern. The methods
applied here actually resolve the main problems present in this type of analysis. By us-
ing lags of the regressors as instruments for the regressors themselves, and estimating a
model in rst-dierences, we can overcome both types of endogeneity without the need for
outsider instruments. Both procedures are designed (i.e., best suitable) for panels with a
large number of rms and a small number of time periods (large N, small T), compactible
with our dataset to be described further ahead. Corrections are also available to solve
heteroskedasticity, based on two-step estimates that are asymptotically consistent.
4.3 Known biases and the proliferation of instruments
With large datasets the number of potential instruments becomes very large. We might
be tempted make use several lags to instrument each variable, under the principle that
more information is always benecial, but this turns out not to be so simple. The system
that produces the parameter estimates is usually overidentied (with more instrument
than endogenous variables) and postestimation procedures should be used to check the
validity of the instruments used. As noted in the literature, if the matter of proliferation
of instruments is not attended to, signicant bias is to be expected in parameter esti-
mates (overtting bias) and test statistics (commonly the Sargan or Hansen's J statistics,
used to validate instruments used) that rely on estimated standard errors that perform
poorly under overproliferation of instruments|see for instance Tauchen (1986), Wind-
meijer (2005) and Roodman (2009a, 2009b). Windmeijer (2005) suggests a correction to
the traditional two-step standard errors that performs very well in simulations, making
them asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. We shall refrain from using the Sargan
test which is a special case of Hansen's J statistic and is not robust to heteroskedasticity;
we shall apply the Windmeijer correction whenever appropriate; and we shall keep the
instrument count in check. A bold rule-of-thumb is to keep the number of instruments
well below the number of groups (in this case rms) in the sample.
5 Data
The dataset uses micro data collected by the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics
(INE) and is composed of an unbalanced panel spanning 11 years (1995-2005) of monthly
data from 3887 rms (large N, small T) of the industry sector. Firms are identied by a
scal number (npc) and an industry-sector number (cae, rev.2.1). The dataset provides
information on the total number of workers (n), total number of hours worked (h), rm
sales (s), total wages (wn) and wages per worker (w).
10Table 1: Employment equation (Dierence GMM, exogenous variables)
One-step Two-step
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: eit eit = nit eit = hit eit = nit eit = hit
ei;t 1 0.711 (0.123)* 0.780 (0.165)* 0.608 (0.060)* 0.743 (0.072)*
ei;t 2 -0.005 (0.035) 0.009 (0.016) -0.027 (0.016) 0.017 (0.013)
sit 0.257 (0.027)* 0.309 (0.048)* 0.255 (0.017)* 0.300 (0.028)*
si;t 1 -0.055 (0.027)* -0.091 (0.043)* 0.001 (0.019) -0.060 (0.025)*
si;t 2 0.001 (0.009) -0.009 (0.013) 0.013 (0.007) -0.009 (0.010)
wit -0.111 (0.049)* -0.060 (0.087) -0.195 (0.026)* -0.209 (0.041)*
wi;t 1 0.024 (0.034) 0.028 (0.040) 0.048 (0.027) 0.006 (0.026)
Long-run Elasticities
sales 0.691 0.991 0.641 0.963
wages -0.294 -0.152 -0.350 -0.850
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano{Bond AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano{Bond AR(2) 0.004 0.221 0.015 0.274
Exogeneity of Instruments
Dierence in Hansen 0.002 (13) 0.020 (13) 0.020 (13) 0.259 (13)
Observations/Groups 16543/3199 16541/3199 16543/3199 16541/3199
Instruments 71 71 71 71
Notes: (i) GMM-type instruments used for lagged dependent variables only (ii) Columns (1) and (2) represent
robust one-step and two-step estimates using workers (n). Columns (3) and (4) represent the same for hours (h).
Standard errors in parentheses with stars indicating statistical signicance at 5% level; (iii) All variables are in logs
(iv) Time dummies were included (v) Tests shown are P-values (d.f.)|higher is better.
6 Results
A number of studies have been carried out on this topic. For European countries, Abraham
and Houseman (1999) apply a generalized Koyck model to the same problem, using data
on workers and hours for several manufacturing sectors in Germany, France, Belgium and
the United States, but disregarded the problem of endogeneity altogether. Such is a case
with a number of other studies. In the source papers of on-set GMM instrumentation
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) provide not only the theory but
also applications for their methods using annual microeconomic rm data for the United
Kingdom. These two studies shall be kept as a benchmark against which to compare the
result obtained here for Portugal.
We start by reproducing the methodology of Arellano and Bond (1991) for Portugal.
After annualizing our dataset, the model is estimated through Dierence GMM, assuming
the explanatory variables to be strictly exogenous, except for the lagged dependent variable
which is taken to be endogenous (thus instrumented via GMM procedures with own past
lags).
Results are given in Table 1. Columns labeled (1) and (3) provide one-step and two-
step estimates using the number of workers as a measure of employment, which are directly
comparable with the estimates from columns (a1) and (a2) of Table 4 in Arellano and Bond
(1991), the only dierence being the fact that we do not include capital in the equation as
it is not available in our dataset. We observe a rst-lag coecient of 0.711 and 0.608 for
11Table 2: Employment equation (Dierence GMM, endogenous variables)
One-step Two-step
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: eit eit = nit eit = hit eit = nit eit = hit
ei;t 1 0.810 (0.074)* 0.834 (0.064)* 0.767 (0.031)* 0.794 (0.033)*
ei;t 2 0.032 (0.042) 0.027 (0.018) 0.001 (0.012) 0.035 (0.009)*
sit 0.159 (0.046)* 0.218 (0.050)* 0.182 (0.017)* 0.199 (0.018)*
si;t 1 -0.080 (0.020)* -0.101 (0.025)* -0.041 (0.011)* -0.061 (0.012)*
si;t 2 -0.011 (0.011) -0.018 (0.012) -0.001 (0.005) -0.021 (0.007)*
wit -0.089 (0.056) -0.073 (0.051) -0.125 (0.020)* -0.122 (0.021)*
wi;t 1 0.052 (0.029) 0.047 (0.027) 0.085 (0.012)* 0.063 (0.010)*
Long-run Elasticities
sales 0.428 0.709 0.603 0.686
wages -0.235 -0.187 -0.172 -0.344
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano{Bond AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano{Bond AR(2) 0.001 0.069 0.004 0.079
Exogeneity of Instruments
Dierence in Hansen 0.294 (8) 0.332 (8) 0.294 (8) 0.332 (8)
Observations/Groups 16543/3199 16541/3199 16543/3199 16541/3199
Instruments 190 190 190 190
Notes: (i) GMM-type instruments used for all variables (ii) Columns (5) and (6) represent robust one-step and
two-step estimates using workers (n). Columns (7) and (8) represent the same for hours (h). Standard errors in
parentheses. Notes (iii), (iv) and (v) from Table (1) apply.
models (1) and (3), respectively. These contrast with Arellano and Bond's 0.686 and 0.629.
As one would expected, Portugal shows a higher rst-order autoregressive coecient for
workers implying a higher level of rigidity (the second-order coecient is small and not
statistically signicant for both studies), although the same is not true for hours. The
two models provide similar coecients for the remaining variables, with two-step estimates
being more precise as given by standard errors. Columns (2) and (4) display the same
results but using hours, rather than workers, as a measure of employment. Estimates of
the main parameter of interest, 0.780 and 0.743, are higher than the estimates for workers,
again, an eect contrary to our a priori intuition. Regarding the explanatory variables, we
can measure the short-run (or impact) elasticities given by the contemporaneous impact
of xit on yit, @yit=@xit, and the long-run elasticities given by the corresponding cumulative
eect, i.e., the impact of xit on the equilibrium level of yit,
P1
j=0 @yit=@xi;t j. For
sales these elasticities have the expect sign with the short-run elasticity varying between
0.255 and 0.309 and the long-run elasticity between 0.641 and 0.991. For wages, short-run
elasticities have in general small coecients while long-run elasticities vary between -0.152
and -0.850.
Tests for the exogeneity of instruments turn out rather poor, which is not surprising
given the assumption of strictly exogenous sales and wages. For the explanatory variables
with more than one lag, the more recent lags are, at least in part, determined by the older
lags, rendering these variable predetermined and, therefore, not strictly exogenous. Besides
this, economic theory alone provides sucient reasoning to suspect that employment,
12Table 3: Employment equation (System GMM, endogenous variables)
One-step Two-step
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable: eit eit = nit eit = hit eit = nit eit = hit
ei;t 1 0.878 (0.027)* 0.859 (0.045)* 0.877 (0.023)* 0.889 (0.033)*
sit 0.690 (0.056)* 0.941 (0.093)* 0.609 (0.056)* 0.849 (0.070)*
si;t 1 -0.566 (0.065)* -0.799 (0.115)* -0.488 (0.065)* -0.745 (0.085)*
wit -0.671 (0.062)* -0.935 (0.107)* -0.582 (0.061)* -0.846 (0.079)*
wi;t 1 0.457 (0.085)* 0.660 (0.148)* 0.393 (0.081)* 0.669 (0.104)*
Median Adjustment Laga 5.34 4.56 5.30 5.92
Long-run Elasticities
sales 1.016 1.009 0.985 0.941
wages -1.762 -1.950 -1.542 -1.594
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano{Bond AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano{Bond AR(2) 0.149 0.038 0.213 0.049
Exogeneity of Instruments
Dierence in Hansen
ei;t 1 0.807 (03) 0.386 (03) 0.807 (03) 0.386 (03)
sit 0.129 (15) 0.480 (15) 0.129 (15) 0.480 (15)
si;t 1 0.222 (15) 0.575 (15) 0.222 (15) 0.575 (15)
wit 0.067 (16) 0.776 (16) 0.067 (16) 0.776 (16)
wi;t 1 0.074 (15) 0.108 (15) 0.074 (15) 0.108 (15)
Observations/Groups 23416/3482 23415/3482 23416/ 3482 23415/3482
Instruments 74 74 74 74
Notes: (i) GMM-type instruments used for all variables (ii) Columns (9) and (10) represent robust one-step estimates
using workers (n) and hours (h), respectively. Columns (11) and (12) represent two-step estimates. Windmeijer
robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes (iii), (iv) and (v) from Table 1 apply.
a) For all models, the Median Adjustment Lag is expressed in years.
wages and sales are jointly determined, yielding unsatisfactory the assumption of strict
exogeneity.
Table 2 reports the results of endogenizing wages and sales. First-order rigidity pa-
rameters increase for all models as expected, with hours showing higher rigidity, although
only slightly. Precision, however, is signicantly improved as shown by the lower standard
errors. Short-run elasticities of sales decrease in all models (varying between 0.159 and
0.218) as well as the long-run elasticities (varying between 0.428 and 0.709). Short-run
elasticities of wages have the expected sign and remain small (between -0.073 and -0.125);
long-run wage-elasticities are also small (between -0.172 and -0.344).
Finally, we exploit the System GMM estimator. Allowing for a larger system, it also
allows for a larger number of instruments to be used (past levels and past dierences). A
parsimonious model is estimated and presented in Table 3; the analysis is done for the two-
step estimates. The autoregressive coecient is now equal to 0.877 and 0.899, for workers
and hours, respectively. Notice the number of hours worked still shows up as being more
rigid than the number of workers, although just slightly. Second, test results are favorable,
supporting the validity of the specication used and estimation tools employed.
All elasticities increase in absolute value, with quite large dierences in the wage-
13elasticities viz- a-viz the corresponding Dierence GMM model. Short-run elasticities of
sales/wages are 0.609/-0.582 for the number of workers and 0.849/-0.745 for the number
of hours, respectively, comparable to Blundell and Bond's (1998) estimates from a simi-
lar model (for the number of workers but replacing sales with capital), where they nd
a short-run elasticity of wages equal to -0.797 and a sluggishness parameter equal to 0.810.
7 Conclusions
System GMM provides the best-performing models in this context of high temporal rigidity
(high level of ). Thus, models (11) and (12) of Table 3 deliver the most trustful results
with all coecients having the appropriate sign and all tests providing evidence in support
of the validity of the instruments used. For the number of workers we nd an autoregressive
parameter equal to 0:877 and long-run elasticities of 0.985 and  1:542 for sales and wages,
respectively. Blundell and Bond (1998) nd an autoregressive parameter of 0:810 and a
long-run elasticity of wages equal to  1:307 for the UK. We can also have a temporal
measure of these levels of rigidity via the median adjustment lag, the time it takes the
system to adjust halfway to a new equilibrium in response to a shock. Our results imply
approximately 5- and 4.5-year periods for 50% of the adjustment in workers and hours
to take place, respectively. This compares with the 3.3 years for the number of workers
in the UK (Blundell and Bond, 1998) and 1.9, 3.1, 1.6 and 0.4 years for the number of
workers in Germany, France, Belgium and United States, respectively, and 1.3, 2,1 and
0.3 years for the number of hours in Germany, France and United States (Abraham and
Houseman, 1999).
The rigidity can in the Portuguese labor market can also be observed by looking at
the short- and long-run elasticities. For instance, model (11) in Table 3 provides short-
and long-run wage-elasticities of  0:582 and  1:542, respectively. This compares with the
values of  0:797 and  1:307 for the UK (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This implies that,
although the Portuguese labor market has a larger (long-term) response to a change in
wages than the UK does, these changes come about very slowly, as hinted by the lower
short-run but larger long-run wage-elasticities for Portugal. These conclusions are not,
however, independent of the conclusions obtain with the rigidity parameter, since it enters
in the computational formulas of long-term elasticities.
Contrarily to what could be initially expected, adjustment in the number of workers
and the number of hours does not dier considerably. In particular, we nd no evidence
that the adjustment through the number of hours is faster than the adjustment through
the number of workers. One reason could be that the overtime premium for extra hours is
suciently high so that rms do not have strong incentives to substitute hours for workers.
Still, our main conjecture stands: adjustment dynamics in the Portuguese labor market
are very slow, implying a range of structural problems typical of countries with a sclerotic
14labor market.
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16Appendices
Table A.1: Synthetic Indicators of Employment Protection
Strictness: Strictness: Strictness:
Overall regular temporary collective
strictness employment employment dismissals
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Australia 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.9 2.9 2.9
Austria 2.4 2.2 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 3.3 3.3
Belgium 2.5 2.5 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.6 4.1 4.1
Canada 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 2.6 2.6
Denmark 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.1
Finland 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.4
France 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1
Germany 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.0 2.0 1.3 3.8 3.8
Greece 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.3 4.8 3.1 3.3 3.3
Hungary 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.6 1.4 2.9 2.9
Iceland n.a. 1.6 n.a. 1.7 n.a. 0.6 n.a. 3.5
Ireland 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.6 2.4 2.4
Italy 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.8 3.6 2.0 4.9 4.9
Japan 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.5
Korea 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.4 1.9 1.9
Luxembourg n.a. 2.3 n.a. 2.8 n.a. 3.8 n.a. 3.9
Mexico 3.2 3.2 2.3 2.3 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8
Netherlands 2.8 2.1 3.1 2.7 2.4 1.2 3.0 3.0
New Zealand 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.6 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.4
Norway 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9
Poland 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 0.8 1.8 4.1 3.6
Portugal 3.5 2.9 4.3 4.2 3.0 2.1 2.9 1.9
Spain 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.1
Sweden 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.9 1.6 0.9 3.8 3.8
Switzerland 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 3.9 3.9
Turkey 3.4 3.5 2.6 2.6 4.9 4.9 1.6 2.4
United Kingdom 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.4 2.9 2.9
United States 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.9 2.9
OECD Average 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 3.0 3.0
Portugal's Ranking 1st 5th 1st 1st 8th 10th 14th 18th
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2010
17Table A.2: Quarterly worker 
ows from employment, job creation and job destruction
Workers Workers Job Job
Out In Destruction Creation E to U E to N E to E
Portugal 4.3 3.6 3.0 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
United States 17.8-23.0 16.7-21.9 7.9 5.1 3.9 4.8 2.4-5-4
Notes: Partial reproduction of Tables 6 and 7 in Blanchard and Portugal (2001). In the last 3 columns,
E=Employment, U=Unemployment and N=Inactivity. All values are percentages of employment.
Table A.3: Work Mobility
Employment Unemployment
Average Long-term Average Long-term
Durationa Employmentb Durationa Unemploymentc
2001 118 45 18 42
2002 119 45 18 38
2003 123 45 16 39
2004 126 46 20 48
2005 129 47 21 51
2006 128 45 23 53
2007 126 43 22 50
2008 125 43 23 51
2009 129 44 22 48
2010 130 44 25 56
(a) in months; (b) percentage of workers older than 45 and with more than 20 years of
tenure; (c) percentage of unemployed that have been looking for a job for more than 12
months. Source: INE (Inqurito ao Emprego).
18